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Abstract
We study the effects of broken windows policing on crime using geo-located crime
and arrest reports for 80 Colombian cities. Broadly defined, broken windows policing
consists of intensifying arrests—sometimes for minor offenses—to deter potential crim-
inals. To estimate causal effects, we build grids of 200 × 200 meters over the urban
perimeter of all cities and produce event studies to look at the effects of shocks in
police activity in the periods to follow. We use spikes in the number of arrests with
no warrant—which are more likely associated with unplanned police presence—as a
proxy for shocks in broken windows policing. As expected, we observe an increase in
crimes during the shock period, as each arrest implies at least one crime report. In the
following periods, crimes decrease both in the place of the arrests and the surround-
ings. With many treated grids and many places exposed to spillovers, these effects add
up. On aggregate, the crime reduction offsets the observed increase during the shock
period. Direct effects are more immediate and precise at low crime grids, but benefi-
cial spillovers seem more relevant at crime hot spots. The effects of broken windows
policing circumscribe to cities with low or moderate organized crime, consistent with
criminal organizations planning their activities more systematically than disorganized
criminals.
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1 Introduction
Police manpower and deployment strategies are at the core of crime prevention efforts.
The idea is simple: police presence should decrease the probability of crime occurrence
by either deterring or incapacitating offenders.1 Indeed, the consensus in the literature is
that increases in police manpower lead to fewer crimes.2 Moreover, previous studies suggest
that deployment strategies—such as hot spots policing—not only reduce crime at high crime
areas, but also spill benefits over to surrounding locations.3 However, we know less about
the effects of regular police intensity—or broken windows policing—on crime. This literature
usually focus on the number of driving under the influence and disorderly conduct arrests as
indirect measures of police intensity.4 As noted by Chalfin and McCrary (2017), however,
most studies “are plagued by problems of simultaneity bias, omitted variables, and the
inevitable difficulty involved in finding a credible proxy.”
In this paper, we benefit from three characteristics of the Colombian context to examine
the direct and indirect effects of broken windows policing practices on crime. First, the
availability of the universe of arrest and crime records for 80 cities for 2019. The effects
of police interventions that are not intense in nature, such as broken windows policing,
are usually small in magnitude. Hence without a large enough sample, small effects could
be undetectable. Crime records include the type of crime, exact coordinates and date of
occurrence. Arrest records include the exact coordinates, date of occurrence, and information
on whether the arrest was conducted following an arrest warrant or rather “in-the-act,” when
police patrols happened to observe a crime as they were passing through. These 80 cities
account for roughly 44% of the population of the country.5 We restrict our analysis to the
1See for instance Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973).
2See Chalfin and McCrary (2017) for a complete discussion of the literature on police manpower and
other crime prevention strategies.
3See for instance Braga et al. (2019) for a systematic review of this evidence.
4Sometimes broken windows policing is described as more aggressive enforcement against minor offenses
in order to prevent more serious crime. Hence the focus on arrests for driving under the influence and
disorderly conduct. See for instance Kubrin et al. (2010)
5These are the 80 largest cities of Colombia, excluding the capital Bogotá.
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urban perimeter of these cities.
Second, a wide heterogeneity in police activity and local crime patterns both within and
across cities. The key empirical challenge when estimating the effects of broken windows
policing on crime is that changes in patrolling patterns are not random. We use the coordi-
nates and date of occurrence of all crimes and arrests to build a bi-weekly panel data, where
we use grids of 200× 200 meters within the urban perimeter of the 80 cities as the cross sec-
tional unit. We use this panel to produce event studies where we look at the effects of shocks
in police activity in a given grid and period. We build our direct treatment variable as any
grid and period with three or more arrests conducted “in-the-act.” Two or fewer arrests are
common, and we worried this looser definition would not pick up an actual intensification of
police presence. We focus on arrests with no arrest warrant as these are more likely to proxy
for unplanned police activities. Furthermore, because of the simultaneous determination of
crimes and arrests, we expect the treatment period to show a large increase in crime. Hence
our outcomes of interest are crimes occurring in the periods following the police activity
shock, both where the shock took place as well as in the surrounding areas.
Finally, we leverage the variation within and across cities to look at heterogeneous treat-
ment effects. On the one hand, we examine how the effects change based on the baseline
crime levels of the specific locations where the arrests occurred. To some degree, this analysis
complements the broad literature on hot spots policing by looking at the effects of policing
places with moderate crime levels. On the other hand, we look at how the effects change
across cities based on baseline characteristics of the local crime environment. In particular,
we study whether the effects are different in cities with a stronger tradition of organized
crime. Many criminal organizations plan their actions in advance and strategically adjust to
police activity.6 Hence the effects of broken windows policing may differ depending on how
organized are criminal activities in a city.
This paper offers five sets of results. First, we observe a decrease in total crime in the
6Blattman et al. (2021a), for instance, document how street gangs in Medellín are part of an elaborate,
hierarchical system. These groups coordinate their responses to state action.
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periods following the shock in police activity. As expected, police activity shocks are asso-
ciated with an increase in crime in the concurrent period—each arrest necessarily implies
at least one crime report. But crimes fall monotonically after the shock, reaching a sta-
tistically significant and economically meaningful decrease in the fourth period. Relative
to the average number of crimes occurred one period before the shock, the effects in the
fourth period are equivalent to a 6% decrease. Furthermore, we observe a similar pattern
in areas nearby the location of the shock. The coefficients in the third and fourth periods
are statistically significant, and their magnitudes are equivalent to a decrease of roughly 3%
and 5% in reported crimes, respectively. This suggests the benefits of police activity diffuse
to the surroundings.7
Second, we conduct a back-of-the-envelope estimation of aggregate effects. With many
treated locations, and many places exposed to spillovers for each treated grid, the benefits
add up to potentially large reductions in crime. We find that the decrease in crimes in the
periods after the shock is large enough to offset the observed increase at the shock period.
Our estimate of this aggregate reduction in crime is not precise, but it is close to conventional
levels of statistical significance.
Third, the direct effects are not circumscribed to a specific type of crime. Rather, we
observe similar patterns for both violent and property crimes. For property crimes, however,
the direct effects are imprecisely estimated. We do observe differences in spillover patterns.
Beneficial spillovers are larger and more precise for property crimes.
Fourth, the direct effects of shocks in police activity seem to be more immediate and
precise in low-crime areas. Following the shock, crimes drop between 9% and 13% in the
subsequent periods, relative to the average number of crimes one period before the arrest in
low-crime areas. Crimes in high-crime areas seem to fall by period four after the shock, but
these effects are imprecisely estimated. Beneficial spillovers are more relevant at crime hot
7Jacob et al. (2007) find that crime shocks could also reduce future crime. Hence, an alternative in-
terpretation of our results is that present crime—rather than police activity—could be driving the effects.
However, we believe the most plausible interpretation in our context is that the main treatment is the police
activity shock. We reach this conclusion due to the observed patterns of spatial displacement.
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spots.
Fifth, both direct effects and beneficial spillovers seem to be more important in cities
with low or moderate presence of organized crime. We proxy for organized crime using
the rates of drugs and weapons seizures, as well as the presence of coca crops. Criminal
organizations in Colombia are usually associated with local drug markets and widespread
use of weapons. Also, criminal organizations are traditionally present in cities with coca
crops, both to provide protection and control the supply of coca leaves for the production
of cocaine. All results point in the same direction: direct and spillover effects are larger
and more precisely estimated in cities with low or moderate presence of organized crime.
The coefficients for direct and indirect effects are imprecise and sometimes positive in places
where organized crime is presumably more active, as measured with all these proxies.
This paper contributes to a few strands of the literature. First, criminologists have long
studied the effects of different police deployment strategies on crime. The closest precedent to
this paper are studies focusing on broken windows policing. Sampson and Cohen (1988) use
city-level data to study correlates of broken windows policing practices with robbery rates for
a sample of 171 cities in the US. Their results suggest a negative association between broken
windows policing and crime. MacDonald (2002), and later Kubrin et al. (2010) replicate
the Sampson and Cohen (1988) study with variations in the time frame, main outcomes
and approach. Their results also point to a negative elasticity of crime with respect to the
implementation of broken windows policing practices. Two studies exploit variation within a
single city. Harcourt and Ludwig (2006) and Rosenfeld et al. (2007) use precinct-level data
from New York and find that misdemeanor arrests lead to very small effects on crime.
Second, also related to this paper are studies focusing on police deployment strategies
such as hot spots policing. Broadly, hot spots policing consists of allocating disproportional
police resources in high-crime areas. This has been a frequent subject of study both in
criminology and economics.8 A recent systematic review analyzes 65 studies (Braga et al.,
8See also Kennedy et al. (2001) and Raphael and Ludwig (2003) for a related literature on strategies
known as “pulling levers.” Broadly speaking, these strategies intensify police-citizen interactions, and are
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2019). The aggregate analysis suggests crime decreases by a small but precise amount, and
that most likely benefits diffuse. Studies in the context of Latin America, however, point
to the importance of local crime patterns. For instance, two hot spots policing experiments
in Colombia show different results. Blattman et al. (2021b) find that hot spots policing led
to adverse spillovers of property crime and beneficial spillovers of violent crime in Bogotá.
Collazos et al. (2020) find that patrolling hot spots led to beneficial spillovers on property
crimes in Medellín. Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) study a police re-deployment in Buenos
Aires following a terrorist attack. Their results suggest motor vehicle thefts declined in
places that received additional police. Re-analyzing their data, Donohue et al. (2013) find
that crime displaced to the surroundings.
Third, this paper contributes to the literature on the effects of police manpower on crime.9
This literature generally points to negative elasticities of crime with respect to the number
of available police patrols in a city. Notable studies exploiting quasiexperimental variation
in city-level police manpower in the US include Levitt (2002), Evans and Owens (2007), and
Lin (2009).
Fourth, this paper relates to a growing literature focusing in how the presence of organized
crime might shape the effects of intensifying police and other state resources. For instance,
Magaloni et al. (2020) find that police crackdowns in Rio lead to more violence in areas
heavily controlled by gangs. Also, Dell (2015) finds that crackdowns in cartel strongholds in
Mexico displace violence to other cities. Finally, Blattman et al. (2021a) find that intensifying
state presence in gang territories in Medellín does not crowd criminal rule out, probably due
to a strategic response by gangs to state actions.
A final contribution of this paper is to broaden the regional scope of the literature on the
relationship between police and crime. The literature on hot spots policing is useful as an
example. Of the 65 studies analyzed in the systematic review by Braga et al. (2019), only
usually implemented at or nearby crime hot spots. Braga and Weisburd (2012) conduct a systematic review
of these studies.
9For summaries of this literature, see Chalfin and McCrary (2017) and Levitt and Miles (2006)
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four are outside developed economies. Indeed, 60 concentrate in only three countries: the
US, the UK and Sweden.
This paper is organized in seven sections including this introduction. Section 2 describes
the setting and presents the data. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy. Section 4
presents the baseline results. Section 5 examines the direct effects exploiting within city
variations in baseline crime levels. Section 6 examines both direct and indirect effects ex-
ploiting variation between cities in the incidence of organized crime. Section 7 discusses
policy implications.
2 Setting and data
2.1 Setting
Colombia has roughly 48 million people. Per capita income is about $15,000 per year, ad-
justed for purchasing power parity. The country is divided into 1,102 cities or municipalities.
Each city has an elected mayor and council. According to the Colombian Constitution, the
head of police affairs in the city is the mayor. This role, however, is limited to broad policy
decisions and budgeting for specific investments—such as the purchase of technology or mo-
tor vehicles. In practice, citizen security in a city is the responsibility of the National Police.
The National Police is independent of all municipalities, and a branch of the Ministry of
Defense. The Colombian Police is a relatively well organized and professional force, with
roughly 167 thousand people—hence there are about 350 police officers per 100 thousand
residents in the country.
Patrolling activities are organized in multiple layers of jurisdictions. Metropolitan or
regional police departments are at the top of the hierarchy.10 These departments are divided
into police districts. In turn, each police district is divided into police stations. Stations
10Metropolitan departments are for large cities and metropolitan areas, covering a limited number of cities.
Regional departments cover a larger number of smaller cities.
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are divided into CAIs—Comandos de Acción Inmediata. Finally, each CAI is divided into
police quadrants—which are equivalent to police beats. The size of each quadrant is usually
relatively large. In Medellín, the second largest city, each quadrant covers 50 street blocks
on average.
Police quadrants are the basis for police patrolling activities. Each police quadrant has
six police officers that patrol in pairs, with each pair covering one of three daily shifts. Po-
lice patrols plan their patrolling activities in regular meetings at the police station. In these
meetings, the station commander and the police agents in charge of the quadrant decide on
routes, times and locations to patrol. Police guidelines include instructions to specifically im-
plement different forms of broken windows policing. Normal duties to signal police presence
include running background checks; stopping and frisking people; and conducting arrests.11
Arrests are classified depending on whether there was an arrest warrant for the person, or
otherwise it was conducted “in-the-act,” meaning police patrols happened to observe a crime
as they were passing through.
2.2 Data
The National Police shared data on the universe of reported crimes and arrests for 80 Colom-
bian cities in 2019. These are the largest cities by population, excluding the capital Bogotá
and a few others where data was not available.
Cities in the sample Figure 1 displays the cities in our sample. These are relatively
distributed throughout the Colombian territory. The only exception is the southeastern
region, where the Amazon rainforest lies along with the relatively inhabited eastern plains.
Description of cities Table 1 presents summary statistics on baseline data for the cities
in our sample. On average, these cities have a population of roughly 260 thousand residents.
This population ranges from 65 thousand to 2.5 million residents. Crime also varies largely
11See the Police Surveillance Guidelines
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Figure 1: Cities in the analytical sample
Notes: The map depicts the 80 cities in our analytical sample, in black.
along the distribution of cities. For instance, the average homicide rate per 100 thousand
residents is 27 across all cities. The safest city has a homicide rate of 1.6, and the most
insecure has a homicide rate of almost 170, probably placing it among the most murderous
cities in the world. These cities also differ in terms of the incidence of organized crime.
Drug seizure rates, for instance, vary from 18 to roughly 500 per thousand residents, with
an average of 141. The average city in the sample has 162 hectares of coca crops, but a
majority of cities (70) do not have these illegal crops.
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Table 1: Baseline descriptive statistics for the sample of cities
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Population 262,959.9 391,685.7 64,652.0 2,427,129.0
Total crimes rate 485.0 360.5 13.5 1,927.3
Violent crimes rate 123.0 74.8 4.9 341.5
Homicides rate 26.8 23.8 1.6 169.6
Assaults rate 317.8 125.2 22.0 658.2
Property crimes rate 361.9 302.4 6.5 1,625.5
Personal theft rate 410.9 223.5 24.9 977.5
Vehicle theft rate 12.8 14.9 0.0 80.7
Motorcycle theft rate 77.7 59.2 4.9 290.2
Drug seizure rate 140.9 11.3 18.4 498.8
Weapons seizure rate 42.2 24.8 7.1 155.4
Coca presence (ha.) 162.2 840.0 0.0 7,125.3
Number of cities 80
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics at the city level for the sample of cities for which
data is available. Column (1) reports means, column (2) reports standard deviations, column (3)
reports minimum values, and column (4) reports maximum values.
Crime and arrest records Criminal records include the exact location coordinates, the
type of crime, and the time and date. Arrest records include the exact location coordinates,
an indicator for whether the arrest followed a warrant or was conducted in-the-act, and the
time and date. These data are from SIEDCO—Sistema de Información Estadístico, Delin-
cuencial, Contravencional y Operativo. While some coordinates may be imprecise, in urban
areas of large cities the extent of imprecision is relatively minor, as most reporting stations
have interactive maps to help citizens locate their crime reports. Moreover, while under-
reporting is a real concern, the research design accounts for idiosyncratic characteristics of
places, which should partly mitigate the problem.
Setup and data structure To study the effects of shocks in police activities, we divide
the urban area of all 80 cities into grids of 200×200 meters. We build a panel data for which
the time units are periods of two weeks and the cross-sectional units are these grids. We use
the location coordinates of crimes and arrests to assign each of them to only one grid across
9
Figure 2: Illustration of treatment and spillover grids
Notes: The figure illustrates how grids are exposed to the direct treatment, spillover or control
conditions in a given period.
all cities.
Treatment conditions We define a shock in broken windows policing as any period of
time when three or more arrests were conducted in-the-act in a given grid. Two or fewer
arrests are relatively common, and we worried this looser definition of the treatment would
not pick up an actual intensification of police activities—i.e., citizens may fail to interpret
more common events as actual intensification of police presence. We also define a spillover
treatment. Any grid with a shared border—including the corners—with a treated grid is
exposed to the spillover condition. For simplicity, we only exploit the extensive margin of
both treatments. Finally, grids that are not exposed to either direct treatment or spillovers
at a given period are controls. Figure 2 illustrates how grids are exposed to these treatment
conditions.
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Outcomes We use additive crime indexes for total crime, violent crime and property crime.
The index for violent crime is the sum of homicides and assaults. The index for property
crimes is the sum of personal thefts and motor vehicle thefts. The index for total crime
consists of the sum of violent and property crimes. We do not include other types of crimes
such as sexual assault or burglary as these are largely under-reported and happen mostly
within houses and businesses.12 We focus on these outcomes in the periods following the
shock in broken windows policing.
Descriptive statistics Table 2 reports descriptive statistics at the grid-period level for
the main analytical sample: grids that were exposed to either direct or spillover effects at any
given period over 2019. Panel A presents data on the exposition to both treatments. Direct
treatment occurs for roughly 0.8% of grids and periods. As expected, the spillover treatment
occurs more frequently, for about 6.2% of grids and periods.13 Panel B presents data on the
main outcomes. On average, a total of 0.44 crimes occurred at any given grid and period.
Most of these are property crimes. The average grid and period had 0.36 property crimes
and 0.09 violent crimes.
3 Empirical strategy
We study the effects of broken windows policing on crime by following a difference-in-
differences approach with differential treatment timing, including leads and lags to observe







αkSg,t−k + γg + ηc × δt + εg,c,t (1)
12See Blattman et al. (2021b), who conducted a large survey on crime reporting and other outcomes in
Bogotá in 2016.
13Note for each grid directly treated there are eight grids exposed to spillovers. In some cases, however,
one grid is exposed to spillovers resulting from more than one neighbor being treated.
14See for instance Gómez et al. (2021) for a similar empirical application using grids of 70 × 70 meters
over Medellín to study the effects of surveillance cameras con crime.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics at the grid-period level
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Exposition to treatments
Treatment 0.008 0.091 0 1
Spillovers 0.062 0.241 0 1
Panel B: Outcomes
Total crime 0.444 1.212 0 89
Violent crime 0.088 0.368 0 12
Homicides 0.006 0.084 0 4
Assaults 0.081 0.354 0 12
Property crimes 0.366 1.122 0 89
Personal theft 0.320 1.091 0 89
Car theft 0.006 0.079 0 3
Motorcycle theft 0.029 0.180 0 6
Number of grids 338,208
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics at the grid-period level for the sample of 338,208
grids. Column (1) reports means, column (2) reports standard deviations, column (3) reports
minimum values, and column (4) reports maximum values.
where g indexes the grids of 200 × 200 meters, c indexes the city and t indexes the time
periods. yg,c,t is the relevant outcome at grid g, city c and period t. Bg,t−k is an indicator for
whether grid g at city c had a broken windows policing shock at time t− k. The parameters
βk for k = −3,−2, ..., 4 with k 6= 1 measure the direct impact of the broken windows policing
shock at each period k, relative to the number of crimes in the period prior to the shock.
Furthermore, the parameters αk for k = −3,−2, ..., 4 measure the spillover impact of the
broken windows policing shock at each period k, relative to the number of crimes at grids
directly exposed to the shock in the period prior to the shock. γg are fixed effects at the
grid level, and control for unobserved idiosyncratic characteristics of the locations that are
invariant over time. ηc× δt control for unobserved temporal shocks fixed for all grids, which
we allow to vary across cities. Finally, εg,c,t is an error term.
This is a relatively standard event study with one difference. In our context, grids can
be treated more than once over the study period. Hence we force early leads and late lags
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into the α−3 and β−3 coefficients for direct and spillover effects, respectively.
Inference Assuming that treatment can produce spatial spillovers creates a problem for
inference. When one grid is exposed to the direct treatment condition, all the grids around it
are exposed to the spillover condition as a cluster. With many grids being treated across each
city, this creates a clustering structure that is hard to conform with a standard geographical
unit such as a neighborhood. This is a problem of fuzzy clustering (Abadie et al., 2017).15
To address this problem, we perform two estimations of standard errors and p-values. On
the one hand, we use the standard approach in panel data and cluster standard errors at the
grid level. On the other hand, we use randomization inference to estimate exact p-values
under the sharp null hypothesis of no effect for any unit. While this is more standard in
experiments, where treatment can be randomly reassigned across experimental units, we
implement it in our context by randomly switching the places that are exposed to the direct
treatment and spillover conditions.16 We estimate treatment effects under 1,000 different
random scenarios and estimate a p-value comparing our observed effects with the empirical
distribution of treatment effects. This procedure is agnostic of the structure of the errors.
4 Baseline results
4.1 Direct and spillover effects
Table 3 presents the baseline results from our estimation of equation (1), and Figure 3
plots the conventional figure for event study estimates. I Table 3, the relevant independent
variables are in panels A and B. Column (1) reports the coefficients for total crime. This
is an additive index of all homicides, assaults, personal and motor vehicle thefts at a given
grid and period. Columns (3) and (4) report standard errors clustered at the grid level and
15This problem is present in similar crime studies. See for instance Blattman et al. (2021b), Collazos et al.
(2020) and Gómez et al. (2021)
16We randomly change treatment assignment and then assign the spillover condition to the grids that have
a common border with a treatment grid.
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randomization inference p-values, respectively.
Panel A reports results for direct effects. As expected, we observe a large increase in
total crime at the period of the shock. Each arrest necessarily implies at least one crime
report (or more, when offenders commit several crimes simultaneously). From this period
onward, however, crimes decrease monotonically. Four periods after the shock, the effects
are statistically significant at conventional levels when we cluster standard errors at the
grid level. Randomization inference p-values suggest the coefficients are rather imprecise,
however. The coefficient in the fourth period is −0.067, equivalent to a 6% decrease in crimes
relative to the average number of crimes at treated grids in the period before the shock.
Panel B reports results for spillover effects. We do not observe a statistically significant
increase in crimes at the period of the shock. This suggests crimes were localized where
police happened to be present, with no concurrent beneficial or adverse spillovers. In the
periods to follow, we also observe a decline in reported crimes in areas nearby the treated
grid. The effects are statistically significant at conventional levels three and four periods
after the shock, when we cluster standard errors at the grid level. As for the direct effects,
randomization inference p-values suggest these coefficients might be imprecisely estimated,
though in the fourth period the p-value is below 0.05. The coefficients in the third and fourth
period are −0.033 and −0.052, respectively. Relative to the average number of crimes at
treated grids in the period before the shock, these effects are equivalent to a 3% decline in
period three and a 5% decline in period four. These are beneficial spillovers resulting from
broken windows policing activities. Moreover, the number of grids exposed to spillovers
is substantially larger than grids exposed to direct treatment. Hence, the spillover results
suggest the relative imprecision of the estimates for direct effects may be due to statistical
power rather than to the absence of effects.
Furthermore, the results suggest that crime pre-trends were similar before the shock,
both for grids directly exposed to broken windows policing activities and grids exposed to
spillovers. Not only the coefficients are not statistically significant individually, but they are
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Table 3: Direct and spillover effects of broken windows policing on crime
Coefficient Standard error RI p-value
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Direct effects
Period -3+ or 5+ -0.011 [0.028] (0.924)
Period -2 0.008 [0.039] (0.763)
Period -1 - - -
Period 0 0.697 [0.051]*** (0.000)***
Period 1 0.024 [0.040] (0.741)
Period 2 -0.016 [0.036] (0.799)
Period 3 -0.036 [0.038] (0.601)
Period 4 -0.067 [0.038]* (0.197)
Panel B: Spillover effects
Period -3+ or 5+ -0.020 [0.017] (0.446)
Period -2 -0.007 [0.017] (0.964)
Period -1 -0.013 [0.016] (0.783)
Period 0 0.005 [0.018] (0.854)
Period 1 -0.016 [0.019] (0.630)
Period 2 -0.012 [0.017] (0.647)
Period 3 -0.033 [0.016]** (0.337)
Period 4 -0.052 [0.017]*** (0.042)**
Panel C: Tests for pre-trends
Direct effects: Prob >F 0.795
Spillover effects: Prob >F 0.426
Outcome mean in period -1 1.065
Observations 338,208
Number of grids 13,008
Number of cities 80
R-squared 0.414
Grid fixed effects Yes
Period × city fixed effects Yes
Notes: The table reports baseline results for the estimation of equation (1). Column (1) reports
coefficients, column (2) reports standard errors clustered at the grid level, and column (3) reports
randomization inference p-values. We force early leads and late lags into the coefficients denoted
as ‘Period -3+ or 5+’. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
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Figure 3: Direct and spillover effects for the baseline model
(a) Direct effects (b) Spillover effects
Notes: The figure plots the results estimating of equation (1) for total crimes. The lines denote
confidence intervals at the 90% level. We force early leads and late lags into the period denoted as
‘-3+ or 5+’.
also not jointly statistically significant, as reported in Panel C.
4.2 Aggregate effects
Our baseline results suggest the benefits of the shock in broken windows policing materialize
several periods after the shock, both in places exposed to treatment and the surroundings.
Hence, as Blattman et al. (2021b) point out, the coefficients are important but also relevant
is the number of places exposed to each condition.
In this section, we conduct a back-of-the-envelope estimation of aggregate effects. To
do so, we multiply each estimated treatment effect by the number of grids exposed to each
condition. Table 4 presents the results. In the shock period, we estimate there is an aggregate
increase of 1,986 crimes in the grids where police patrols conducted the arrests. After the
shock, the aggregate decrease in places exposed to direct treatment and spillover effects adds
up to 2,503 crimes. Hence we estimate that these policing activities led to a net decrease of
roughly 517 crimes. We use the 1,000 simulations of treatment effects to produce a p-value
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of the aggregate net change in crimes. We find that our estimate for the net decrease is
imprecise, but borderline significant at conventional levels.
Table 4: Aggregate effects of broken windows policing on crime
Coefficient # grids Total = (1) × (2)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Treatment effects, shock
Direct effects
Period 0 0.697 2,849 1,985.8
Panel B: Treatment effects, post-shock
Direct effects
Period 1 0.024 2,766 6.4
Period 2 -0.016 2,713 -43.4
Period 3 -0.036 2,680 -96.5
Period 4 -0.067 2,651 -177.6
Spillover effects
Period 1 -0.016 20,572 -329.2
Period 2 -0.012 20,274 -243.3
Period 3 -0.033 19,815 -653.9
Period 4 -0.052 19,718 -1,025.3
Net decrease in crime -517.0
RI p-value 0.110
Notes: The table reports aggregate effects of preventive policing practices. Column (1) reports
coefficients, column (2) reports the number of grids exposed to each condition, and column (3)
reports the aggregate effect. We estimate RI p-values by simulating 1,000 different random scenarios
and comparing our estimated aggregate effect with the empirical distribution of aggregate effects.
4.3 Effects by type of crime
We now turn to examine whether the effects of broken windows policing are different for
violent and property crimes. Figure 4 plots the event study estimates. Subfigures 4a and
4b report results for violent crimes. This is an additive index of all homicides and assaults
at a given grid and period. Violent crimes are less common, hence entail fewer variation.
The direct effects generally point to a decrease in crimes in the periods following the broken
windows policing shock. As with the total crime index, the coefficient turns significant at
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conventional levels in the fourth period. Spillover effects are far less precise, though the
estimates seem to follow a decreasing pattern.
Subfigures 4c and 4d report results for property crimes. This is an additive index of all
personal and motor vehicle thefts at a given grid and period. The direct effects also point
to a decrease in crimes in the periods following the broken windows policing shock, though
this decrease is imprecisely estimated. Spillover effects are more precise. The coefficients in
the periods following the shock are all negative. In periods three and four, the estimates are
statistically significant at conventional levels.
4.4 Robustness
Sample of grids In our baseline analysis, we restrict the sample to grids that were ex-
posed to either direct or spillover effects at any period during 2019. We believe this approach
produces a relatively good comparison group: we directly compare average crimes in grids
exposed to some treatment with average crimes in grids that were not exposed to any treat-
ment in that same period, but that were exposed at other period or periods. Figure 5 plots
the event studies for direct and spillover effects when we include the universe of 73,282 grids
covering the urban perimeter of all 80 cities in our sample. The results are similar in both
direction and precision to our baseline estimates.
Treatment definition In our baseline, preferred specification, we define a shock in broken
windows policing as any period of time where three or more arrests were conducted in-the-
act in a given grid. As we mention above, two or fewer arrests are relatively common, and
we worried that this looser definition would not pick up an actual intensification of police
activities. Figure 6 presents the results when we define treatment as any period of time
when two or more arrests were conducted in-the-act. As we anticipated, this definition
of our treatment leads to more imprecise estimates. The coefficients for direct effects fall
monotonically, but become negative only in the fourth period. This coefficient, however, is
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Figure 4: Direct and spillover effects for violent crime and property crime
Violent crime
(a) Direct effects (b) Spillover effects
Property crime
(c) Direct effects (d) Spillover effects
Notes: The figure plots the results estimating of equation (1) for violent and property crimes,
separately. Subfigures 4a and 4b report results for violent crimes, and subfigures 4c and 4d report
results for property crimes. The lines denote confidence intervals at the 90% level. We force early
leads and late lags into the period denoted as ‘-3+ or 5+’.
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Figure 5: Direct and spillover effects for the universe of grids
(a) Direct effects (b) Spillover effects
Notes: The figure plots the results estimating of equation (1) for total crimes. The lines denote
confidence intervals at the 90% level. We force early leads and late lags into the period denoted as
‘-3+ or 5+’. We include all grids in our sample.
imprecisely estimated. Spillover effects behave broadly similar to our main estimates.
5 Within-city heterogeneity: Crime hot spots
We turn our attention to the heterogeneity of treatment effects depending on baseline char-
acteristics of the grids. Most of the literature on policing activities focus on strategies such
as hot spots policing, where police patrols are disproportionately concentrated in crime hot
spots. This analysis broadens this scope, looking at effects in places with low or moderate
levels of criminal activity. We estimate equation (1) but interact the vector of treatment
effects with a dummy variable for being in the 100th percentile of total crimes according
to the baseline crime data. Subfigures 7a and 7b report estimates for low crime grids, and
subfigures 7c and 7d report estimates for high crime grids. We use baseline crime levels for
two months of 2018.
Broadly speaking, the direct effects of shocks in police activity seem to be more immediate
and precise in low-crime areas. Crimes in high-crime areas also seem to fall by period
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Figure 6: Direct and spillover effects under a different definition of treatment effects
(a) Direct effects (b) Spillover effects
Notes: The figure plots the results estimating of equation (1) for total crimes, using an alternative
definition for treatment. We define a shock in broken windows policing as any period of time when
two or more arrests were conducted in-the-act in a given grid. The lines denote confidence intervals
at the 90% level. We force early leads and late lags into the period denoted as ‘-3+ or 5+’.
four after the shock, but the corresponding coefficient is imprecisely estimated. Beneficial
spillovers are larger and more precise in high-crime grids, as earlier findings from the hot
spots policing literature suggest (Braga et al., 2019).
6 Between-city heterogeneity: Organized crime
In this section, we exploit the wide between-city heterogeneity in the local criminal envi-
ronment, focusing on proxies for the presence of organized crime. Absent complete data
of criminal organizations across the country, we use three alternative proxies: illegal drug
seizure rates, illegal weapon seizure rates, and presence of coca crops. Criminal organizations
typically engage in illegal drug markets and use illegal weapons to enforce their territorial
control, hence our first two proxies. Furthermore, criminal organizations are usually present
in cities with coca crops. Their presence serves many purposes, from providing protection
to the crops to controlling the supply of coca leaves for the production of cocaine. For the
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Figure 7: Direct and spillover effects in low- and high-crime grids
Low-crime grids
(a) Direct effects (b) Spillover effects
High-crime grids
(c) Direct effects (d) Spillover effects
Notes: The figure plots the results estimating of equation (1) for low- and high-crime grids, sep-
arately. Subfigures 7a and 7b report results for low-crime grids, and subfigures 7c and 7d report
results for high crime grids. The lines denote confidence intervals at the 90% level. We force early
leads and late lags into the period denoted as ‘-3+ or 5+’.
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first two proxies, we split the sample of cities at the median. For the third proxy, se split
the sample in cities without or with coca crops.
Drug seizures Figure 8 report the results. Subfigures 8a and 8b present direct and
spillover effects for the sub-sample of cities below the median level of the illegal drug seizure
rates. Subfigures 8c and 8d report direct and spillover effects for cities above the median.
Broadly, the results suggest the direct effects are similar in both sub-samples, but we only
observe evidence of beneficial spillovers in cities with low or moderate levels of organized
crime.
Weapon seizures Figure 9 report the results. Subfigures 9a and 9b present direct and
spillover effects for the sub-sample of cities below the median level of the illegal weapon
seizure rates. Subfigures 9c and 9d report direct and spillover effects for cities above the
median. We observe direct treatment effects only for the sub-sample of cities below the
median. Similarly, we only observe beneficial spillovers in cities with low or moderate levels
of organized crime.
Coca presence Figure 10 report the results. Subfigures 10a and 10b present direct and
spillover effects for the sub-sample of cities with no presence of coca crops. Subfigures 10c
and 10d report direct and spillover effects for cities with presence of coca crops. Most of the
cities in our sample have no presence of coca crops (70). We observe direct and spillover
effects only for the sub-sample of cities with no coca presence. While we acknowledge that the
smaller number of cities in the sub-sample of cities with coca implies more limited statistical
power, the coefficients are either positive or close to zero in periods three and four for direct
effects, and positive for spillover effects across all periods.
Taken together, these results suggest the effects of broken windows policing are rather
circumscribed to cities with low or moderate presence of organized crime. We avoid testing
whether the difference in governance treatment effects between the two subgroups is statis-
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Figure 8: Direct and spillover effects for sub-samples based on the median of the illegal
drug seizures rate
Below median
(a) Direct effects (b) Spillover effects
Above median
(c) Direct effects (d) Spillover effects
Notes: The figure plots the results estimating of equation (1) for two sub-samples of cities: Those
below the median level of the illegal drug seizure rates, and those above the median level. Subfigures
8a and 8b report results for cities below the median, and subfigures 8c and 8d report results for
cities above the median. The lines denote confidence intervals at the 90% level. We force early
leads and late lags into the period denoted as ‘-3+ or 5+’.
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Figure 9: Direct and spillover effects for sub-samples based on the median of the illegal
weapon seizures rate
Below median
(a) Direct effects (b) Spillover effects
Above median
(c) Direct effects (d) Spillover effects
Notes: The figure plots the results estimating of equation (1) for two sub-samples of cities: Those
below the median level of the illegal weapon seizure rates, and those above the median level.
Subfigures 9a and 9b report results for cities below the median, and subfigures 9c and 9d report
results for cities above the median. The lines denote confidence intervals at the 90% level. We force
early leads and late lags into the period denoted as ‘-3+ or 5+’.
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Figure 10: Direct and spillover effects for sub-samples based on the presence of coca crops
No presence
(a) Direct effects (b) Spillover effects
Presence
(c) Direct effects (d) Spillover effects
Notes: The figure plots the results estimating of equation (1) for two sub-samples of cities: Those
with no presence of coca crops, and those with any presence of coca crops. Subfigures 10a and 10b
report results for cities below with no presence, and subfigures 10c and 10d report results for cities
with presence. The lines denote confidence intervals at the 90% level. We force early leads and late
lags into the period denoted as ‘-3+ or 5+’.
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tically significant—as we are already testing too many coefficients at once, but overall, this
result is consistent with criminal organizations planning their activities more systematically
relative to disorganized criminals (e.g., Blattman et al., 2021a).
7 Discussion
Crime is a major problem in many parts of the world. Thousands of cities struggle with high
violent and property crime rates. In Latin America, for instance, the aggregate homicide
rate has remained virtually unchanged for at least three decades—at relatively high levels.
Police forces are perhaps the primary policy tool that governments use to control crime. Yet
most research in policing strategies concentrates in parts of the world where crime rates are
lower, the criminal environment is less diverse and complex, and institutional capacity is
stronger.
Our work suggests a few insights. First, on average, broken windows policing strategies
seem to work in the Colombian context. Not only do crimes decrease, but also the benefits
in crime reductions spill over to neighboring areas. The direct effects are important for both
violent and property crimes, though there seem to be differences in the diffusion patterns.
In light of the very few studies on broken windows policing overall, and what we believe to
be the non-existent knowledge base produced in Latin America, these results are promising
policywise, both for the region and regions other than the developed world.
Second, these strategies work differently in low- vs high-crime areas. Perhaps as expected,
broken windows policing strategies have a more immediate and precise impact in low-crime
areas. Reducing crimes in high crime hot spots seem to be out of reach for simple patrolling
strategies such as broken windows policing. Other deployment tactics, such as hot spots
policing, may be a better fit for high crime places. Hence we see our work as a complement
to the growing literature on hot spots policing in the region (e.g., Collazos et al., 2020;
Blattman et al., 2021b).
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Third, somewhat obviously, the complexity of the criminal environment matters for the
effects of broken windows policing strategies. Criminal organizations usually plan their
activities beforehand and respond strategically to state efforts. Latin America is a region
plagued with criminal organizations controlling retail drug markets, collecting extortion, and
regulating other forms of crimes such as theft and homicides. Our results are consistent with
this idea, as we only see effects in places with low to moderate organized crime (e.g., Blattman
et al., 2021a; Dell, 2015; Magaloni et al., 2020). These results suggest policing strategies
should follow the local criminal context. A standard approach is probably insufficient to
tackle more complex criminal responses.
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